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Abstract
The first chapter of this dissertation deals with different cash-back rebates in
the new-automobile market. In the automotive industry, manufacturers use different
types of cash-back rebates to attract buyers to their brands. In this chapter, I mainly
focus on the use of “conquest cash” and “loyalty cash” which enable manufacturers
to discriminate price among different groups of customers. The conquest cash and
loyalty cash are based on consumers’ purchase history. The purpose of conquest cash
is to poach the rival manufacturers’ customers, whereas the loyalty cash lowers prices
for the manufacturer’s customers. Moreover, I examine “college-graduate” discounts
and “military” discounts which manufacturers use to practice price discrimination
on certain demographic groups of customers. I empirically investigate the factors
associated with greater use of these offers in the U.S. auto industry and compare
these patterns to predictions from the theoretical literature. The theoretical studies
include product differentiation and brand preferences as plausible reasons to explain
price discrimination by purchase history. My results suggest that manufacturers’
market share impacts the manufacturers’ decision for customer poaching and customer
retention. However, the manufacturers’market share does not determine the use of
college-graduate and military discounts.
The second chapter examines how competition affects information disclosure
on Airbnb. Airbnb accommodates lodging for travelers by matching hosts and guests
ii
in an online platform. Hosting on this platform has been getting popular in recent few
years. Similar to other online platforms, sharing photos, description of a product, and
reviews of previous users are possible ways to attract customers. It is possible that
as the competition among Airbnb’s listings increases, hosts change the description of
their listings. Theoretical papers include different relationships between competition
and information disclosure. I use publicly available data of Airbnb’s listings in San
Fransico and its surrounding cities to examine whether an increase in the number of
listings impacts hosts’ information disclosed about the quality of listing. My findings
suggest that on average a higher number of listings increases the number of words in
the description of listings.
iii
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Chapter 1
Cash-Back Rebates in
New-Automobile Market
1.1 Introduction
Firms may use different types of customers’ information such as purchase
history, age, and military membership as a tool to implement their pricing strategy.
Using such information can help firms to segment the customers into different groups
and offer different prices to each group. For instance, grocery chain stores offer loyalty
cards to the customers who shop there regularly. Cell phone carriers often use special
prices and promotions to induce their rivals’ customers to change their carriers. A lot
of clothing brands offer special discounts to military members and college students.
In the new-automobile market, manufacturers frequently offer lower prices to
their returning customers, known as loyalty cash, and also offer discounts to their
rivals’ customers, known as conquest cash. Besides, military discount and college-
graduate discount are other types of common discounts in this market. Although in
recent years such cash rebates have become more popular among automobile manu-
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facturers, their nature has not been studied carefully.
Different cash-back rebates in the new-automobile market can be explained by
third-degree price discrimination. The theoretical literature of third-degree price dis-
crimination is focused on customer segmentation based on the differences in demand
elasticities. The lower prices are offered to price-sensitive customers and higher prices
are available to a less elastic group of customers.
Customer segmentation may also happen based on customers’ past purchasing
decision which the literature refers to it as price discrimination by purchase history.
The literature explains this particular type of price discrimination by product dif-
ferentiation and switching cost. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) find that firms with
similar market shares poach each others’ customers, whereas a lower market share
firm poaches its competitor’s customers more aggressively. Shaffer and Zhang (2000)
explain if two firms have customers with similar brand loyalty, both firms should
poach their competitors’ customers, whereas firms with lower brand loyalty should
pay their own customers to stay and their competitors should pay to switch. Chen
and Pearcy (2010) describe that high intertemporal brand preference leads firms to
poach rivals’ customers, whereas lower intertemporal brand preference leads the firms
to pay their own customers to stay. These studies suggest that firms should pay lower
prices to a group of customers who have weak preferences, and it can be either firm’s
customers or its rivals’ customers.
In this chapter, I empirically study the automobile manufacturers’ decision
to use cash-back rebates as their price setting strategy. My primary focus is on
conquest and loyalty cash-back rebates. This chapter is the first to empirically study
the automobile manufacturers’ decision to use conquest and loyalty cash. Results from
the theoretical literature are used to motivate a variety of empirical tests. Following
the insights of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), I investigate whether manufacturers with
2
lower market share are more likely to use conquest offers. Based on the predictions
of Shaffer and Zhang (2000) and Chen and Pearcy (2010), I examine whether the use
of conquest and loyalty rebates differs between groups of manufacturers (domestic
versus foreign) or vehicle types (luxury versus non-luxury) that are likely to experience
different levels of customer loyalty or brand preference intensity. For example, sellers
in luxury car segments may face customers with stronger brand preference and less
price-sensitivity. Domestic and foreign manufacturers may also cater to different types
of customers and respond by utilizing different types of rebates.
My results suggest that one percentage point increase in market share for
foreign manufacturers decreases the probability of offering loyalty cash by 0.31 per-
centage point. However, one percentage point increase in market share for domestic
manufacturers increases the probability of offering loyalty cash by 0.36 percentage
point. Moreover, one percentage point increase in market share for non-luxury brands
increases the probability of offering conquest cash by 0.40 percentage point, whereas
one percentage point increase in market share for luxury brands decreases the prob-
ability of offering conquest cash by 0.17 percentage point.
The empirical results suggest that it is possible as the market share of foreign
manufactures increases, these manufacturers may get customers with higher brand
loyalty and do not need to offer loyalty cash to their customers. On the contrary,
higher market share domestic manufactures may acquire customers with lower brand
loyalty and offer loyalty cash to keep their high market share. Luxury brands with
higher market share may get customers with strong preferences who are less likely
to switch when offered conquest cash, whereas non-luxury brand automobiles are
relatively similar to each other and may be able to substantially increase sales by
offering discounted prices to rivals’ customers.
In section 1.2, I describe the theoretical models of third-degree price discrim-
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ination with the emphasis on the literature of price discrimination by the purchase
history. I explain the application of cash-back rebates in the automobile market in
section 1.3. Section 1.4 describes data and develops an empirical strategy. Section
1.5 provides the results, and the last section concludes.
1.2 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Economists have been studying price discrimination for many decades.1 The
main idea behind price discrimination is to charge different prices to buyers based on
their willingness to pay. The literature traditionally describes a setting in which a
monopolist firm can practice price discrimination. However, a more recent approach
to this matter explains the possibility of price discrimination in an oligopoly market.
Corts (1998) and Holmes (1989) describe a context in which firms in an
oligopoly setting can practice third-degree price discrimination. Corts (1998) out-
lines that competing firms may or may not agree on recognizing strong market and
weak market. Robinson (1933) defines the strong market as the less elastic group of
customers, whereas the weak market is the more elastic group of customers. In other
words, the strong market has customers with higher brand preference compared to
the weak market. If all firms agree on the weak market, as Corts describes the market
shows best-response symmetry. In a different scenario, the competing firms may not
assign the same groups as their weak and strong markets. Corts (1998) calls this
setting a market with best-response asymmetry.
Firms may divide customers into the weak and strong markets, and offer a
different price to each segment based on customers’ preferences revealed by their pre-
vious purchase. In this setting, the firms only know about the preference of customers
1The history goes back to the researches done by Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933).
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over their product versus their rivals’ product, and they cannot exactly identify the
consumer’s location (Armstrong (2006)). Therefore, firms can employ purchase his-
tory as a criterion for price discrimination. Such customer segmentation is a type
of third-degree price discrimination which literature refers to as behavior-based price
discrimination or price discrimination by purchase history. Customers who do not
have a strong preference for any firms’ products are offered lower prices to either stay
with their current firm or switch to the competitors.
Chen (1997) is the first paper which describes “paying customers to switch”
in a theoretical framework. Chen infers that customers face a switching cost in a
repeated purchase market, and customers who switch firm are offered lower prices.
Shaffer and Zhang (2000) explain that depending on firms’ relative brand loyalty,
firms may pay to switch or pay to stay. According to these authors, if both firms
have customers with similar brand loyalty, both firms poach each others’ customers.
However, if firms face dissimilar brand loyalty, the firm with lower brand loyalty should
offer lower prices to its customers, and the other firm should poach rival’s customers.
Chen and Pearcy (2010) describe the price discrimination based on purchase history
as a matter of intertemporal brand preference. If price commitment was feasible in
the long run, firms with lower preference dependence pay to stay. According to Chen
and Pearcy (2010), customer poaching would happen if customers were locked in with
a high switching cost.
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) explain poaching prices when customers’ prefer-
ences towards differentiated products are fixed over time. These authors find that
poaching occurs based on firms’ market share in the previous period. Two firms with
a similar market share in the last period would both poach each others’ customers.
However, firms with different market shares may behave differently. The firm with a
lower market share would poach more aggressively.
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Following Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Esteves (2014) studies a special case
which firms know in advance about their own customers’ intention of switching.
Therefore, the firm’s own customers can be divided into two groups: the first group
is the customers who are not interested in switching and the second group who are
willing to switch to the rivals. Her model is based on loyalty offers designed for the
second group of customers. Before switching, the firm uses a loyalty discount to make
the switching less attractive.2 The rest of theoretical papers are extensions of either
Chen (1997) model or Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) approach to price discrimina-
tion based on purchase history (Villas-Boas, 1999; Chen and Iyer, 2002; Pazgal and
Soberman, 2008; Esteves, 2014; Amorim and Esteves, 2016).
The theoretical papers provide different interpretations to explain price dis-
crimination based on purchase history. However, these studies mainly focus on cus-
tomer poaching and do not incorporate the role of market share as a reason to explain
the possibility of both paying to stay and paying to switch. Moreover, this literature
has not been broadly tested empirically in different markets. Therefore, the lack of
empirical work and integration of market share in these studies urge more work in
this area. The goal of this chapter is to fill the gap between the theoretical works and
empirical framework in the new-automobile market.
One of the empirical papers which examine price discrimination based on pur-
chase history is Mahmood (2014). This paper examines the decision of competing
firms to practice purchase history price discrimination in an experimental setting. The
author finds that poaching new customers does occur when customers have homoge-
neous preferences. However, heterogeneity in preferences intensifies price discrimina-
tion. Unlike Chen and Pearcy (2010), Mahmood’s results suggest that loyalty rewards
2The theoretical model explained by Esteves (2014) does not occur in many markets. For instance,
in the new-automobile market, customers do not let their current manufacturer know that they plan
to switch to a different manufacturer.
6
cannot be a dominant strategy when customers obtain heterogeneous preferences.
1.3 Institutional Background
Automobile manufacturers compete fiercely with each other to attract new
customers and retain the old ones. To stand out against their competitors, the man-
ufacturers use new features, novel platforms, modern technology, and offer different
types of discounts and financing options.
Discounts in the form of cash-back rebates are used frequently by manufactur-
ers in the new-automobile market. These offers are available for purchasing, leasing,
and financing new cars. Such rebates can be categorized into two groups: general
cash back and conditional cash back (Kelly Blue Book 2018).3 The general cash back
is a type of discount which any type of customer can use. However, customers who
are eligible for conditional discounts should meet specific condition and criteria. Cus-
tomers can use general cash back and typically one conditional offer at the time of
purchase.
The goal of this paper is to explain the factors which drive automobile manu-
facturers to apply conditional offers based on the existing theoretical work on third-
degree price discrimination. Specifically, my primary focus is to examine conquest
cash and loyalty cash offers. I also investigate on two relatively common conditional
offers, college-graduate and military discounts.4
Conquest cash and loyalty cash are designed based on customer recognition by
the purchase history. The loyalty cash rewards the returning customers, and conquest
cash entices rivals’ customers to switch. Manufacturers target these offers to their
3Retrieved from https://www.kbb.com/car-news/all-the-latest/
conditional-rebates-knowing-what-to-ask-can-save-you-money/2100004474/ on 3.1.2018.
4There are other types of rebates such as uber driver discounts which are less common among
manufacturers.
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weak market, which may be the manufacturers’ customers or rivals’ customers. In
other words, if a manufacturer finds its customers as the weak market, it is more likely
to offer them loyalty cash, whereas if the manufacturer considers its rivals’ customers
as the weak market, the manufacturer uses conquest cash.
College-graduate and military discounts are not offered based on the purchase
history of the customers. These types of discounts are available for customers with
certain demographic characteristics. College-graduate discounts are typically avail-
able for customers who graduate from college within the last two years or would
graduate within the next six months. The recent college graduates should provide a
proof of source of income to show their ability to pay for the finances. This group of
customers usually have a limited credit history. Military discounts are offered to the
United State’s active and reserve military members, military veterans, retires, hon-
orable discharged or disabled military members, or their spouse. The manufacturers
employ college-graduate and military discounts because recent college graduates and
military members are considered as the weak market to them.
The customers find out about the cash rebates during their search process in
the automobile market. Specifically, they obtain such information from their direct
visit to dealerships, online search, and advertisement.5,6 During the customers’ visit
to dealerships,a salesperson is allowed to ask customers the type of current car that
the potential customers acquire. This way the dealerships can gather information
about the customers’ purchase history with a negligible cost by just asking for cus-
tomers’ current car registration.7 Additionally, the salesperson may ask the customers
5Busse et al. (2006) examine the pass-through rate of different cash rebates. They find that
customers receive 70 to 90 percent of customer cash. Conquest and loyalty cash are considered as
customer cash promotions.
6The online offers can be typically found on websites such as kellybluebook.com, edwards.com,
or on the manufacturer’s website.
7Identifying the purchase history in different markets might be a costly process. For instance, in
online markets, firms set up ”cookies” in their website to track down their visitors’ behavior through
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about their demographic features such as education, occupation, income, and mili-
tary status which assist the dealerships in classifying the customers within different
groups. To be eligible for college-graduate discounts, the customers should present
a proof of graduation, and for military discounts, the customers should have either
a military identification or a proof of military affiliation. Based on this information,
the customers are offered conquest cash or loyalty cash, military and college graduate
discounts issued by manufacturers.
Although the average amount of conquest and loyalty cash, college-graduate
and military discounts during different months tend to be relatively constant, their
availability may vary slightly among manufacturers within different cities and months.8
The content and the value of college-graduate and military discounts are usually con-
stant, whereas the content and the values of conquest cash and loyalty cash change
in their specificity. Typical loyalty cash offered by a make lists the eligible model
years, and sometimes includes the exact nameplate which qualifies for loyalty offer.
For instance, Audi offers loyalty cash to returning customers of the model year 2005
or newer. Conquest offers may target all nameplates or only specific nameplates
manufactured by the rivals. Some conquest offers include an only particular eligible
segment for conquest cash. For instance, Nissan offers conquest cash on Nissan Titan
to current owners of Chevrolet Silverado.
Manufacturers use the cash-back rebates on different methods of payment:
purchase, lease, and finance. Some of the offers on lease and purchase may not be
the same as for finance. Moreover, there are some conquest and loyalty offers specific
to leasing, which allows a leasee to return the automobile a few months before the
the time, or pay a third party to sell them such information (Acquisti and Varian (2005); Varian
(2001); Taylor (2004)).
8As Table 1.4 suggests, conquest and loyalty cash, and college-graduate and military discounts
do not follow any seasonality.
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maturity date of the lease. These types of offers, which are known as pull-ahead
offers or early turn-in, can be in the form of both conquest and loyalty offers. If
such early turn-in offers are part of loyalty cash, the manufacturers typically wave
the remaining last three lease payments. For instance, Ford offers three-month early
turn-in on Focus, one of its nameplates. Similarly, for conquest offers, a manufacturer
pays the remaining last few payments up to a certain amount to encourage the rivals’
customers to terminate their lease contract earlier and switch firm. For instance,
Porsche offer “Welcome to Porsche” credit to the rivals’ customers who end their
lease earlier than the maturity date and switch from competing manufacturers to
Porsche.
Table 1.1 presents the makes which offer conquest and loyalty cash, college-
graduate and military discounts from December 2017 to April 2018 in six selected
cities.
1.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
I gather data for this chapter from different sources including Automotive News
website, usnews.com and Kelly Blue Book webpage.9 The data on cash-back rebates
are collected for December 2017 through April 2018 from Automotive News website
where provides data for 33 makes, excluding exotic automobile manufacturers.10 The
cash-back rebates consist of purchasing, leasing, and financing new cars. Most of the
nameplates available in this period were nameplates with the model year of 2017 and
2018. Therefore, I limit the data to model years 2017 and 2018.11 I use the United
State Census’ divisions of sub-regions to select data for rebates available in six cities
9https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/rankings and https://www.kbb.com are retrieved 3.1.2018
10Exclusions are Alfa Romero, Maserati, Rolls-Royce, McLaren, Bentley, and Tesla.
11In my sample, there were small number of nameplates from model years 2014-2016, and 2019.
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of Chicago, Kansas City, Houston, Jacksonville, Boston, and New York City. These
cities are the most populated cities in their sub-region.
Manufactures which use the cash-back rebates, may not apply them to all
trims of a particular nameplate. I assign zero to the trims with no offers, and one
to the trims, which have these offers. In my dataset, only 10% of loyalty offers
and 9% of conquest offers to vary among trims. Such variation is even less among
college graduate and military discounts, 2.5% and 2.8% respectively. Subsequently, I
aggregate the offers for all types of purchase, lease, and finance methods on different
trims for a given nameplate, and take the average of offers within the trims. Therefore,
my dependent variable is a fraction of each of these offers within trims of a nameplate.
To construct market share, I access the nation-wide sales number from Auto-
motive News website.12 The sales data used in this chapter are on an aggregated level
for all trims, and all model years. I use narrowly defined 23 segments provided by
usnews.com to calculate the market share. Figure 1.1 illustrates the average market
share within the segments. I define the market share for the previous period as twelve
months before a month which offers are applied. Therefore, the market share is based
on an average of sales number among these twelve months. For instance, for offers
in December 2017, I first calculate the average sales number from December 2016 to
November 2017, then I define market share within the segment based on the average
sales number.
I use manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) for the base models as the
price of nameplates, and I web-scrape it from usnew.com.13 Car characteristics are
12For market share calculation, having sales number on zip-code level provided by registration
data would be ideal which I do not access such data.
13In automobile market, there are three types of price: invoice price, manufacturer’s suggested
retail price (MSRP), and negotiated price. Invoice price is the price which the dealers pay to
manufactures, and MSRP is the suggestive price from manufacturers to dealers. The dealers can
add a markup amount to MSRP, and sell at higher prices. Ultimately, the negotiated price is the
actual transacted price paid by buyers after negotiating with the dealers. For nameplates which the
11
collected from Kelly Blue Book webpage. All characteristics reflect the base model,
and they include horsepower, wheelbase, curb weight, and cost per mile. Cost per mile
is calculated based on the average consumption of relevant fuel in city and highway.
For cars consuming gasoline, cost per mile is calculated by dividing the nation-wide
average of monthly gasoline price on a mile per gallon (MPG). For electric cars, cost
per mile is calculated in two steps. The first step is converting miles per gallon
gasoline equivalent (MPGe) to miles per kilowatt-hours (MPK), and second, dividing
the nation-wide average of monthly electricity price by MPK. For hybrid cars, an
average cost per mile for gasoline and electric is calculated (U.S. Energy Information
Administration 2018).14
The summary statistics are shown in Table 1.2 and it exhibits that the loy-
alty cash is the most popular cash-back rebate compared to conquest cash, college-
graduate and military discounts. In this chapter, these offers are not mutually ex-
clusive. In other words, there are nameplates which possess all of these four offers.
The number of observations for the monetary value of conquest and loyalty cash in
Table 1.2 is not equal to the number of entire samples. Such difference occurs be-
cause the amount of some of these offers is not observable to me for several reasons.
First, some of the manufacturers do not specify the amount of the offer in my data
source. Second, as mentioned in Section 3, some of the offers are specific to leasing
in the form of early turn-in and pull-ahead. Third, some conquest and loyalty offers
are directly mailed to the customers. Therefore, sub-samples available for the dollar
value of conquest cash and loyalty cash do not include all observations.
To examine the influence of market share on the probability of offering the
prices were not available on usnews.com, I acquire the prices from jdpower.com.
14The nation-wide average of monthly gasoline price and the nation-wide average of monthly elec-
tricity price are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Retrieved from https://www.
eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m and https:
//www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_5_3 on 2.1.2018.
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cash-back rebates I use
offernymvct =α + β1market sharent−1 + β2priceny + β3make yearn
+ β4Xnym + γm + ζv + θc + νt + nymvct
(1.1)
where offernymvct can be the probability of offering loyalty cash, conquest cash,
college-graduate discount, and military discount. In other words, I have four depen-
dent variables. These offers are available on nameplate n for model year y, produced
by make m, with vehicle class v offered in city c and month t. Although endogeneity
may be a concern in models where price is a function of market share, my speci-
fication does not have the price level as its outcome variable. My focus is on the
differences between prices which different groups of customers pay. In addition, fol-
lowing Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), I use the market share of the previous period
which also reduces the potential for reverse causality. Make Year refers to the name
plate’s production year of 2017 or 2018, and it is equal to one if the make year is
2017. X is product characteristics. To control for average differences across makes,
vehicle classes, cities and months on the propensity to offer rebates, I include make
fixed effect γm, vehicle class fixed effect ζv, city fixed effect θc, and time fixed effect
νt.
15
The likelihood of offering the cash-back rebates may vary based on customers’
preferences for manufacturers. Moreover, the effect of market share may depend on
the manufacturers’ origin (domestic versus foreign), and type of brand (luxury versus
non-luxury). Employing such segmentation, the likelihood of offering the conditional
15I assign nine groups of vehicle classes including small cars, midsize cars, large cars, compact
SUVs, large SUVs, compact pickup trucks, full-size pickup trucks, cargo van, and minivans for
vehicle class fixed effect.
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offers can be estimated as
offernymvct =α + β1market sharent−1 + β2foreignm ×market sharent−1
+ β3priceny + β4make yearn + β5Xnym + γm + ζv + θc + νt + nymvct
(1.2)
and
offernymvct =α + β1market sharent−1 + β2luxurym ×market sharent−1
+ β3priceny + β4make yearn + β5Xnym + γm + ζv + θc + νt + nymvct.
(1.3)
In model (1.2), foreign is a binary variable which is equal to one if the manufacturer
is either Asian or European. In model (1.3), luxury is a binary variable which is
equal to one if the nameplate is categorized as a luxury brand by usnews.com. Based
on usnews.com, the luxury segments are luxury sport cars, small luxury cars, luxury
midsize cars, large luxury cars, luxury subcompact SUVs, luxury compact SUVs,
luxury midsize SUVs, and large luxury SUVs. The interaction term between market
share and foreign manufacturere in (model 1.2) captures differences between domestic
and foreign manufacturers in the impact of market share on the likelihood of using the
conditional offers. Similarly, the interaction term between market share and luxury
brand in model (1.3) captures differences between luxury and non-luxury brands in
the impact of market share on the likelihood of using the conditional offers.
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1.5 Results
In this section, first I report results related to conquest and loyalty offers.
Second, I present results for the descriptive analysis of college-graduate and military
discounts.
1.5.1 Offering Conquest or Loyalty Cash
In this section, first, I examine the impact of market share on the likelihood of
offering conquest and loyalty cash. Second, I analyze whether foreign and domestic
manufacturers use these rebates differently. Third, I investigate the simultaneous use
of conquest and loyalty offers.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.5 presents the results of the model (1.1) which
examines how within-segment market share affects the use of loyalty and conquest
cash. A consistent relationship between market share and rebates is not clear when
examining all cars, but this is a result of the fact that different makes use these rebates
differently.
I estimate models (1.2) and (1.3) which their results are reported in columns
(3) to (6) of Table 1.5. Model (1.2) includes the impact of manufacturers’ origin on
market share which drives manufacturers’ decision to offer loyalty or conquest cash.
According to columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.5, domestic manufacturers with higher
market share are more likely to offer loyalty cash, whereas higher market share for
foreign manufacturers lowers the probability of offering loyalty cash. In other words,
higher domestic market share manufacturers view their customers as the weak mar-
ket and offer them lower prices. The difference in the likelihood of offering loyalty
cash by foreign and domestic manufacturers may be explained by brand preferences.
The consumers shape their preferences by gaining information about manufacturers’
15
product after experiencing it. Following Chen and Pearcy (2010), customers of for-
eign manufacturers may adopt higher preference dependency over time compared to
domestic customers. In contrast, market shares do not significantly impact the use
of conquest cash by foreign or domestic manufacturers.
I examine model (1.3) to study how the relationship between market share
and the likelihood of offering conquest or loyalty cash differs depending on the brand
type (luxury versus non-luxury). Estimates from model (1.3) are shown in columns
(5) and (6) of Table 1.5. Based on these columns, higher market share non-luxury
brands are more likely to poach the rivals’ customers, while luxury brands with higher
market share are less likely to offer conquest cash. Within non-luxury brands, the
nameplates are more similar to each other and therefore these cars are considered
as more substitutable to customers. On the other hand, a lower likelihood of of-
fering conquest cash by luxury brands with higher market share may be explained
by the strong preferences of luxury brand customers. According to Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000), aggressive poaching occurs due to having a relatively lower market
share. However, my results imply that in the automobile market, the higher market
share of non-luxury brands indeed increases the likelihood of poaching. There is no
evidence that the relationship between market share and loyalty cash differs across
manufacturers’ brand type.
As a robustness check, I estimate models (1.2) and (1.3) for each month sep-
arately. The results are reported in Table 1.12 to Table 1.16, and confirm the results
of the entire sample. Also, I examine models (1.2) and (1.3) for the dollar amount of
conquest or loyalty cash as the outcome variable, and the results of these estimations
are reported in Table 1.6.
Furthermore, I divide my sample into four sub-samples of luxury foreign, lux-
ury domestic, non-luxury foreign, non-luxury domestic to examine the likelihood of
16
offering conquest or loyalty cash in each of these groups. The results are shown
in Table 1.7. Among luxury foreign and luxury domestic manufacturers, on average,
market share does not significantly impact the use of conquest or loyalty cash. Among
non-luxury foreign manufacturers, higher market share lowers the probability of of-
fering loyalty cash to the returning customers, whereas higher market share among
non-luxury domestic manufacturers increases the probability of offering loyalty cash.
These results may be explained by brand preference. Customers of non-luxury foreign
manufacturers are more loyal compared to customers of non-luxury domestic manu-
facturers. Although non-luxury foreign and non-luxury domestic manufacturers are
more likely to offer conquest cash as their market share increases, this impact is not
significant for non-luxury foreign brands.
I also estimate specifications without manufacturer fixed effects to examine
whether foreign and domestic manufacturers differ in their overall use of conquest or
loyalty cash. The results in Table 1.8 suggest that on average Asian and European
manufacturers are less likely to use either loyalty or conquest offers. By avoiding the
practice of price discrimination based on purchase history, foreign manufacturers resist
a comprehensive competition which leads all manufacturers to compete in offering
lower prices. Corts (1998) describes a situation where all competing firms engage in
offering a lower price and calls it an all-out competition. My results do not show such
all-out competition in offering conquest and loyalty cash in the automobile market.
Table 1.9 shows the likelihood of offering conquest or loyalty cash by foreign
and domestic manufacturers conditioned on the type of brand. Based on columns
(1) and (3) in Table 1.9, non-luxury European manufacturers are less likely to offer
loyalty rebates which suggest that these manufacturers consider their customers as
the strong market. A similar trend occurs for Asian luxury manufacturers. Results
in columns (5) and (7) reveal that the lower probability of offering loyalty cash in
17
Asian manufacturers is driven by its luxury brands. It is possible that customers
of Asian luxury brands and European non-luxury brands shape strong brand loyalty.
Therefore, such customers may be considered as already locked-in customers and need
no extra incentives to choose the same manufacturer.
Some makes offer simultaneous conquest and loyalty offers for the same ve-
hicles.16 These types of offers can be used to rank the amount paid by different
customers.17 For instance, Cadillac offers a higher dollar amount for conquest cash
over loyalty cash. This may mean even though Cadillac’s returning customers are
offered a discounted price, they probably negotiate less and are ready to pay a rela-
tively higher price compared to the rivals’ customers who are encouraged to switch
by Cadillac’s conquest cash.
In light of this, I also examine the factors which drive makes’ decision on
applying different dollar values to these simultaneous offers. After dropping zero and
missing values for conquest and loyalty offers, 47% of nameplates in the subsample
have larger conquest offers than loyalty offers. After calculating the ratio of the
dollar amount of conquest offer to the dollar amount of loyalty offer, I define a binary
variable called net conquest which equals one if the dollar amount of conquest offer
exceeds its loyalty offers and zero otherwise.
Table 1.10 and Table 1.11 describe the impact of manufacturers’ market share
and origin on the net conquest respectively. Asian manufacturers with higher mar-
ket share are less likely to offer a lower discount to their customers compared to the
discounts they offer to their rivals’ customers. Additionally, based on Table 1.11,
on average it is less likely for Asian manufacturers to offer a higher amount of con-
quest cash relative to loyalty cash when both rebates are offered concurrently on a
16Table 1.3 lists manufacturers which use simultaneous offers.
17In some cases, the amount of conquest and loyalty offers on a given nameplate is the same.
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nameplate.
1.5.2 Offering College Graduate or Military Discounts
Table 1.17 exhibits the results of the model (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) which examine
how within-segment market share impacts the possibility of offering college graduate
and military discounts by manufacturers. The market share and these rebates do
not show any consistent relationships. Such relationship does not exist even among
a different group of manufacturers and vehicle types.
Manufacturers use college graduate and military discounts to compete with
each other to attract college graduates and military members to their brand. Since
college graduates and military members are elastic groups of customers, they are more
likely to buy lower-priced nameplates. Therefore, on average, lower-priced nameplates
within their segment are more likely to have these discounts. This descriptive analysis
reveals that product differentiation and market share are not correlated with the
likelihood of offering these discounts.
I also investigate whether domestic and foreign manufacturers offer college
graduate and military discounts differently. For this purpose, I estimate specifica-
tions without manufacturers fixed effects, and the results are reported in Table 1.18.
According to these results, the origin of the manufacturers does not explain the like-
lihood of offering college graduate and military discounts.
As a robustness check, I estimate models (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) for five months
separately. The results are reported in Tables 1.19 to 1.23, and confirm that there is no
clear relationship between market share with college graduate and military discounts.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, my focus is conquest and loyalty offers used by automobile
manufacturers in the U.S. new-automobile market. Even though the economists have
been studying the new-automobile market closely, the use of these two specific types
of cash-back rebates has not been examined empirically. These offers are part of
manufacturers’ pricing strategy which is built on customer recognition.
This chapter is the first empirical work which utilizes the insight of the theo-
retical literature of price discrimination by purchase history to examine the likelihood
of offering conquest or loyalty rebates by manufacturers in the automobile market.
My results suggest that the existing theoretical papers cannot fully explain how man-
ufacturers’ market share impacts the application of cash-back rebates to retain their
own customers and poach their rivals’ customers.
My findings imply that differentiated products and market share affect the
manufacturers’ decision to apply conquest cash and loyalty cash. Higher market
share foreign manufactures and higher market share luxury brands are less likely to
offer loyalty cash and conquest cash respectively. Moreover, higher market share
domestic manufacturers are more likely to offer loyalty cash and higher market share
non-luxury brand are more likely to offer conquest cash. Moreover, my findings do not
show any consistent relationship between the likelihood of offering college-graduate
and military discounts with manufacturers’ market share. My hope is that future
work with more data will provide us with a better understanding of the nature of
these offers in the automobile market.
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Figure 1.1: Average of Market Share within Segment in Previous Period
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Table 1.1: Conditional Offers by Makes
Offers Makes
Conquest Cash Acura, Audi, BMW, Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Chrysler,
Dodge, Fiat, Ford, Genesis, GMC, Hyundai, Jeep, Kia,
LandRover, Lexus, Lincoln, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
Porsche, Ram, Volvo
Loyalty Cash Acura, Audi, BMW, Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Chrysler,
Dodge, Fiat, Ford, Genesis, GMC, Hyundai, Infiniti,
Jaguar, Jeep, Kia, LandRover, Lexus, Lincoln, Mazda,
Mini, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Ram, Toyota, Volvo
College-Graduate Discount Acura, BMW, Chrysler, Dodge, Ford, Genesis, Honda,
Hyundai, Jeep, Kia, Lexus, Lincoln, Mini, Mitsubishi,
Nissan, Porsche, Ram, Subaru, Toyota, Volkswagen
Military Discount Acura, Audi, Chrysler, Dodge, Fiat, Ford, Genesis,
Honda, Hyundai, Jeep, Kia, Lexus, Lincoln, Mazda,
Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Ram, Toyota, Volkswagen
Notes: This table includes the list of makes which use the conditional offers in Decmeber 2017
to April 2018 in six cities of Boston, Chicago, Houston, Jacksonville, Kansas City, and New York
City.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Offering General Cash-Back 0.422 0.474 0 1 13,429
Offering Loyalty 0.651 0.459 0 1 13,429
Offering Conquest 0.321 0.449 0 1 13,429
Offering College-Graduate Discount 0.394 0.485 0 1 13,429
Offering Military Discount 0.528 0.494 0 1 13,429
Dollar Amount Offered as Loyalty 443.8 641.4 0 5,000 12,065
Dollar Amount Offered as Conquest 300.8 595.6 0 5,000 10,941
Market Share 0.101 0.1 0.0002 0.889 13,429
Price 37,789 2,2076 11,990 164,900 13,429
Model Year 2017 0.485 0.5 0 1 13,429
Foreign 0.692 0.462 0 1 13,429
Luxury 0.398 0.49 0 1 13,429
Horsepower 242.5 87.1 78 565 13,429
Wheelbase 112.7 57.7 73.7 2,018 13,429
Curb Weight 3,774 777 1,984 6,129 13,429
Cost per Mile 0.110 0.030 0.017 0.324 13,429
Notes: Summary Statistics are based on the offers available from December 2017 to April 2018
in six cities of Boston, Chicago, Houston, Jacksonville, Kansas City, and New York City. Offering
loyalty, conquest, college graduate and military discounts are the fraction of these rebates among
different trims of a nameplate.
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Table 1.3: Magnitude of Simulataneous Offers
Make Conquest = Loyalty Loyalty < Conquest Loyalty > Conquest
Acura 34.29% 65.71% 0
Audi 2.13% 58.51% 39.36%
Buick 6.67 92.22% 1.11%
Cadillac 0 98.63% 1.37%
Chevrolet 7.87% 73.03% 19.1%
Chrysler 0 86.36% 13.64%
Dodge 0 100% 0
Fiat 12.16% 87.84% 0
Ford 4.55% 6.82% 88.64%
GMC 24.14% 51.72% 24.14%
Genesis 71.43% 17.86% 10.71%
Hyundai 47.06% 52.94% 0
Jeep 16.67% 83.33% 0
Kia 100% 0 0
Land Rover 58.33% 41.67% 0
Lexus 52.5% 15% 32.5%
Lincoln 24.27% 48.54% 27.18%
Mazda 83.55% 16.45% 0
Nissan 33.33% 50% 16.67%
RAM 0 78.57% 21.43%
Volvo 0 100% 0
Notes: Some makes use simultaneous conquest and loyalty offers for a given nameplate. This
table lists all three possible simultaneous offers based on their dollar amount from December
2017 to April 2018 in six cities of Boston, Chicago, Houston, Jacksonville, Kansas City, and New
York City.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Conditional Offers by Month
Offers by Month Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Offering Loyalty in December 0.635 0.463 0 1 2,772
Offering Conquest in December 0.328 0.45 0 1 2,772
Offering College Graduate Discount in December 0.438 0.492 0 1 2,772
Offering Military Discount in December 0.519 0.493 0 1 2,772
Offering Loyalty in January 0.646 0.463 0 1 2,739
Offering Conquest in January 0.305 0.444 0 1 2,739
Offering College Graduate Discount in January 0.397 0.485 0 1 2,739
Offering Military Discount in January 0.547 0.494 0 1 2,739
Offering Loyalty in Febuary 0.654 0.458 0 1 2,652
Offering Conquest in Febuary 0.325 0.452 0 1 2,652
Offering College Graduate Discount in Febuary 0.384 0.482 0 1 2,652
Offering Military Discount in Febuary 0.53 0.494 0 1 2,652
Offering Loyalty in March 0.671 0.452 0 1 2,674
Offering Conquest in March 0.354 0.46 0 1 2,674
Offering College Graduate Discount in March 0.359 0.476 0 1 2,674
Offering Military Discount in March 0.531 0.494 0 1 2,674
Offering Loyalty in April 0.648 0.462 0 1 2,592
Offering Conquest in April 0.293 0.439 0 1 2,592
Offering College Graduate Discount in April 0.389 0.485 0 1 2,592
Offering Military Discount in April 0.514 0.496 0 1 2,592
Notes: This table includes summary statistics of conquest and loyalty offers from December
2017 to April 2018 in six cities of Boston, Chicago, Houston, Jacksonville, Kansas City, and New
York City. Offering loyalty, conquest, college graduate and military discounts are the fraction
of these rebates among different trims of a nameplate.
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Table 1.10: Net Conquest and Market Share
(1) (2)
Net Conquest Net Conquest
Market Share 0.445 0.369
(0.335) (0.398)
price/100,000 -1.213* -1.254*
(0.650) (0.691)
Make Year 0.027 0.027
(0.033) (0.034)
Asian x Market Share -2.847** -3.093
(1.312) (1.948)
European x Market Share -0.410 -1.570
(0.750) (1.405)
Luxury x Market Share 0.157
(0.549)
Asian x Luxury x Market Share 0.641
(1.864)
European x Luxury x Market Share 1.622
(1.474)
Horsepower/1000 0.700 0.649
(0.855) (0.884)
Wheelbase/1000 8.269 8.370
(8.473) (8.843)
Curb Weight/1000 -0.182* -0.176
(0.095) (0.112)
Cost per Mile -0.715 -0.760
(0.420) (0.452)
Make FE Yes Yes
Vehicle Class FE Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Observations 2,327 2,327
R2 0.648 0.649
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
segment level.
31
Table 1.11: Net Conquest and Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Conquest Net Conquest Net Conquest Net Conquest
Make Year 0.013 -0.012 0.018 -0.010
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Asian -0.619*** -0.640*** -0.604*** -0.664***
(0.096) (0.088) (0.109) (0.092)
European -0.130 -0.123 0.058 0.044
(0.143) (0.129) (0.122) (0.097)
Luxury -0.078 0.001 0.006 0.003
(0.099) (0.062) (0.204) (0.117)
Asian x Luxury -0.037 0.121
(0.215) (0.157)
European x Luxury -0.436 -0.343
(0.258) (0.201)
Horsepower/1000 0.697 0.378 0.460 0.048
(0.928) (0.793) (1.056) (0.915)
Wheelbase/1000 -3.708 10.315 -1.656 12.805
(7.097) (9.180) (7.622) (9.535)
Curb Weight/1000 -0.035 -0.312*** -0.019 -0.304**
(0.102) (0.109) (0.116) (0.115)
Cost per Mile -1.475*** -0.767** -1.545*** -0.967***
(0.415) (0.281) (0.431) (0.259)
Make FE No No No No
Vehicle Class FE No Yes No Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,327 2,327 2,327 2,327
R2 0.399 0.510 0.412 0.524
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis are two-way clustered
at make and segment level.
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Table 1.12: Loyalty and Conquest Offers in December and Market Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering
Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest
Market Share 0.471* 0.423 0.209 0.399* 0.489** 0.847**
(0.227) (0.460) (0.129) (0.197) (0.181) (0.375)
Price/100,000 -0.108 -0.005 -0.139 -0.039 -0.121 -0.011
(0.100) (0.070) (0.098) (0.080) (0.097) (0.083)
Make Year -0.018 0.016 -0.017 0.016 -0.018 0.013
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Foreign x Market Share -0.635** -0.470 -0.455* -0.813*
(0.255) (0.470) (0.243) (0.400)
Luxury x Market Share -0.341 -0.689** -0.061 -1.284***
(0.244) (0.271) (0.340) (0.445)
Luxury x Foreign x Market Share -0.769 2.096*
(0.774) (1.035)
Horsepower/1000 -0.458 -0.880** -0.230 -0.643** -0.408 -0.744***
(0.394) (0.334) (0.333) (0.270) (0.406) (0.236)
Wheelbase/1000 2.198 0.809 1.704 0.643 2.288 1.074
(3.865) (4.163) (3.663) (3.795) (3.823) (4.129)
Curb Weight/1000 0.035 0.110 0.030 0.100 0.034 0.089
(0.053) (0.065) (0.052) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055)
Cost per Mile 0.394 0.297 0.350 0.309 0.406* 0.393
(0.254) (0.475) (0.244) (0.431) (0.229) (0.383)
Make FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vehicle Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772
R2 0.772 0.723 0.770 0.726 0.774 0.731
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
segment level.
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Table 1.13: Loyalty and Conquest Offers in January and Market Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering
Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest
Market Share 0.707* 0.351 0.267 0.502** 1.270*** 1.064**
(0.354) (0.491) (0.290) (0.195) (0.358) (0.387)
Price/100,000 0.019 0.100 -0.039 0.070 0.002 0.080
(0.108) (0.067) (0.092) (0.054) (0.084) (0.057)
Make Year 0.043* 0.063*** 0.043* 0.063*** 0.041 0.061***
(0.024) (0.017) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018)
Foreign x Market Share -1.198*** -0.290 -1.773*** -1.035**
(0.382) (0.506) (0.378) (0.415)
Luxury x Market Share -0.757** -0.830*** -1.588*** -2.006***
(0.289) (0.293) (0.213) (0.316)
Luxury x Foreign x Market Share 1.637*** 2.112***
(0.301) (0.356)
Horsepower/1000 -1.491** -0.795** -1.072** -0.604** -1.300*** -0.557**
(0.602) (0.343) (0.497) (0.270) (0.410) (0.209)
Wheelbase/1000 2.315 2.045 1.064 1.991 2.208 1.897
(4.008) (3.413) (3.159) (2.906) (4.144) (3.354)
Curb Weight/1000 0.073 0.053 0.070 0.044 0.057 0.034
(0.061) (0.054) (0.054) (0.048) (0.050) (0.042)
Cost per Mile 1.040** 0.701** 0.960** 0.744** 1.114** 0.793***
(0.411) (0.307) (0.432) (0.286) (0.433) (0.239)
Make FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vehicle Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,739 2,739 2,739 2,739 2,739 2,739
R2 0.754 0.737 0.749 0.743 0.765 0.755
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
segment level.
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Table 1.14: Loyalty and Conquest Offers in Febuary and Market Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering
Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest
Market Share 0.314 0.280 -0.069 0.464** 0.634* 1.017**
(0.310) (0.528) (0.237) (0.206) (0.367) (0.434)
Price/100,000 0.069 0.108 0.036 0.085 0.070 0.095
(0.065) (0.068) (0.056) (0.058) (0.064) (0.058)
Make Year 0.029 0.059*** 0.028 0.059*** 0.028 0.058***
(0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019)
Foreign x Market Share -0.676** -0.191 -1.202*** -0.990**
(0.317) (0.521) (0.364) (0.432)
Luxury x Market Share -0.132 -0.743** -0.832*** -1.995***
(0.251) (0.324) (0.287) (0.370)
Luxury Foreign x Market Share 1.320*** 2.188***
(0.342) (0.381)
Horsepower/1000 -0.512* -0.768* -0.294 -0.616* -0.439* -0.547**
(0.272) (0.377) (0.231) (0.308) (0.220) (0.203)
Wheelbase/1000 3.304 1.386 2.510 1.456 3.007 1.059
(2.781) (3.277) (2.516) (2.839) (3.106) (3.272)
Curb Weight/1000 -0.007 0.075 -0.007 0.067 -0.014 0.056
(0.037) (0.056) (0.036) (0.049) (0.033) (0.040)
Cost per Mile 0.471* 0.534** 0.380 0.566** 0.523* 0.659***
(0.272) (0.255) (0.281) (0.241) (0.300) (0.213)
Make FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vehicle Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652
R2 0.734 0.731 0.731 0.736 0.739 0.749
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
segment level.
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Table 1.15: Loyalty and Conquest Offers in March and Market Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering
Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest
Market Share 0.399** 0.050 -0.093 0.023 0.490* 0.089
(0.187) (0.220) (0.239) (0.126) (0.244) (0.229)
Price/100000 -0.022 -0.125 -0.041 -0.127 -0.017 -0.125
(0.068) (0.090) (0.067) (0.088) (0.070) (0.091)
Make Year 0.075*** 0.058** 0.076*** 0.058** 0.075*** 0.058**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Foreign x Market Share -0.725*** -0.048 -1.029*** -0.122
(0.244) (0.216) (0.317) (0.246)
Luxury x Market Share 0.075 -0.005 -0.230 -0.101
(0.221) (0.160) (0.187) (0.281)
Luxury x Foreign x Market Share 0.671** 0.176
(0.252) (0.317)
Horsepower/1000 -0.137 0.084 0.060 0.098 -0.132 0.090
(0.232) (0.235) (0.195) (0.212) (0.225) (0.245)
Wheelbase/1000 -0.563*** -0.012 -0.555*** -0.011 -0.569*** -0.013
(0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
Curb Weight/1000 -0.006 -0.013 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.015
(0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Cost per Mile 0.337 -0.052 0.214 -0.059 0.345 -0.045
(0.200) (0.246) (0.236) (0.233) (0.226) (0.242)
Make FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vehicle Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,674 2,674 2,674 2,674 2,674 2,674
R2 0.814 0.776 0.810 0.776 0.815 0.776
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
segment level.
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Table 1.16: Loyalty and Conquest Offers in April and Market Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering Offering
Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest Loyalty Conquest
Market Share 0.271* 0.419 -0.055 0.554** 0.365 1.091**
(0.134) (0.295) (0.200) (0.208) (0.227) (0.411)
Price/100000 -0.068 0.066 -0.073 0.056 -0.057 0.084
(0.065) (0.102) (0.068) (0.089) (0.067) (0.089)
Make Year 0.071*** 0.101*** 0.071*** 0.104*** 0.070*** 0.103***
(0.025) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) (0.025) (0.016)
Foreign x Market Share -0.501** -0.287 -0.749** -0.969**
(0.210) (0.324) (0.274) (0.432)
Luxury x Market Share 0.144 -0.513 -0.158 -1.092**
(0.202) (0.339) (0.219) (0.522)
Luxury x Foreign x Market Share 0.528* 1.177**
(0.267) (0.561)
Horsepower/1000 -0.049 -0.825* 0.046 -0.687* -0.076 -0.810**
(0.236) (0.445) (0.225) (0.391) (0.228) (0.354)
Wheelbase/1000 0.278 -0.099 -0.425 -0.745 0.143 -0.506
(2.103) (3.645) (1.938) (3.242) (2.196) (3.817)
Curb Weight/1000 0.001 0.115* 0.006 0.118** -0.000 0.111**
(0.032) (0.058) (0.032) (0.054) (0.031) (0.050)
Cost per Mile 0.160 0.343 0.084 0.390 0.172 0.497*
(0.193) (0.344) (0.204) (0.314) (0.206) (0.289)
Make FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vehicle Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592
R2 0.806 0.710 0.804 0.712 0.807 0.718
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
segment level.
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Chapter 2
My Words Against Yours: Case
Study of Descriptions of Airbnb’s
Listings in San Francisco
2.1 Introduction
The existence of online markets expands the possibility of the transaction of
wide ranges of experience goods. The experience goods can be defined as goods or
services which their quality is unknown to consumers before consumption. Just like
any other markets, information in experience good markets is invaluable. The buyers
in online markets rely on the information which is part of product description and
pictures provided by sellers. Although sellers voluntarily disclose some information
about quality to attract the buyers, the precision and amount of information may not
be adequate or accurate.
Airbnb is one of the online platforms which travelers can book accommodation
as an experience good. This platform is one of the well-known players of sharing
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economy, and presents itself as “. . . a trusted community marketplace for people to
list, discover, and book unique accommodations around the world — online or from a
mobile phone or tablet”. The users of this platform are divided into hosts and guests.
Hosts are the providers of accommodation and guests are seekers of accommodation.1
New listings in different cities join the platform every day. Airbnb serves in
more than 191 countries and has accommodated more than 60 million guests during
recent years. The description of listings on Airbnb is a way for hosts to share infor-
mation about their listing. As the number of listings in a given neighborhood or city
increases, the competition among listings is expected to increase which may affect
the amount of information disclosed by hosts.
The importance of information in the market place has been known to economists.
Stigler (1961) and Akerlof (1978) show that asymmetric information leads to mar-
ket power. Salop (1976) mentions that markets with imperfect information can be
described as monopolistic competition rather than perfect competition. Cheong and
Kim (2004) show that if information disclosure is costly in an oligopoly environ-
ment, no firm will reveal any information as the number of competing firms increases.
Hotz and Xiao (2013) explain a model which includes product differentiation with
multi-dimensional attributes and heterogeneous customers. They conclude that firms
decide not to disclose information because disclosure may change demand elasticities
and increase price competition between competing firms. Levin et al. (2009) compare
costly information disclosure in duopoly market and cartels. Their findings show that
a cartel is expected to reveal more information compared to a duopoly environment.
Clinch and Verrecchia (1997) and Board (2009) explain that likelihood of disclosure
decreases as the intensity of competition increases, whereas Stivers (2004) show that
1There are three ways of hosting on Airbnb; hosting the extra, hosting for an acquaintance as a
co-host, and organizing experience. My main focus in this chapter is the first group of hosts.
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increase in a number of competitors or intensity in competition among current sellers
results in higher disclosure.
According to these theoretical papers, the impact of competition on informa-
tion disclosure does not follow a clear direction which highlights the necessity of more
empirical work in different settings. Jin (2005) examines how competition impacts
disclosure incentives among health maintenance organizations. Her findings show that
in a highly competitive market, the disclosure rate is low, and voluntary disclosure
is a way for firms to differentiate their product. Jin and Leslie (2003) examine the
impact of restaurants hygiene grade cards as a measure of revealing information on
the quality of restaurants. Their empirical findings show that the grade cards reduce
the search cost which causes an increase in competition. Lewis (2011) examines the
impact of information disclosure on automobile auction at eBay and finds that disclo-
sure occurs selectively. He adds that the cost of the disclosure can impact the amount
of disclosure and the price which seller sets.
In this chapter, I empirically estimate how competition among Airbnb’s list-
ings in San Francisco and its surrounding cities impacts information disclosure about
the quality of listings. Heterogeneity among Airbnb’s listings is high, and it is plau-
sible that information disclosure differentiates listings for guests. Therefore, I expect
to see more information disclosure as the number of competing listings increases. The
revealed information is measured by the number of words in listings description pro-
vided by the hosts, and competition is based on the proximity of same room type
listings.
My empirical results suggest that an increase in the number of listings within
five miles affects the number of words hosts use to describe their listings. These
results are stronger and more statistically significant for private rooms than for entire
house/apartment listings. A higher number of private rooms within half a mile adds
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on average 2 words to the description. Additional private room listings in further
distances have a smaller impact on the description. Even though this marginal effect
is relatively minor, it shows the positive effect of competition on the amount of
information revealed by hosts. Section 2.2 describes data and develops an empirical
strategy. In section 2.3, I provide the descriptive results. The last section concludes
and describes possible work for the future.
2.2 Data and Empirical Startegy
To get data for Airbnb’s listings, I web-scrape publicly available listings from
the platform. I need to fill in a destination, check in and check out dates, and the
number of guests to get the listings available in this platform. I choose San Francisco
in California as the destination city because it is one of the top tourist attractions in
the United States. The data are gathered on January 14th of 2017 for check in and
check out dates of Friday, February 3rd to Sunday, February 5th of 2017.2 Although
I use San Francisco as the destination, Airbnb includes listings in the surrounding
cities in the Bay Area. In my dataset, 53% of the listings are located in San Francisco.
Table 12 in the Appendix presents the frequency of listings in the surrounding cities.
Moreover, I enter one person for the number of guests, and the results include listings
with at least one guest.
I possess features which can be categorized into two groups; listing’s character-
istics and host’s characteristics. Listing’s characteristics include information about
listing’s location, type of room, type of property, having instant-booking option,
guests capacity, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, allowing guests to have infants
2I pick this date because it was part of a dataset which I already had for a different project.
January 14th includes the highest number of listings for the early February check-in and check-out
date.
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and children, allowing guests to have a pet, and allowing guests to smoke.3 Host’s
characteristics are whether a host speaks at least a foreign language, whether a host
has at least a pet, and type of cancelation policy which a host sets.
Entire house or apartment, private room, and shared room are three room
types available on Airbnb. I drop the shared rooms since they are less than 5% of
the listings in my dataset. Property types for Airbnb’s listings are versatile. I limit
my dataset to the listings with property types including apartment, condominium,
house, guesthouse, and loft. These property types consist 92% of my dataset which
makes the number of observations to 3,026 listings. The rest of the dataset has
either unspecified property types or less conventional property types.4 Hosts can
choose flexible, moderate, and strict cancelation policies for a short-term stay. These
policies specify the portion of refund a guest can get within specified days of the trip.
The summary statistics of San Francisco’s listings are shown in Table 2.1.
Although I access to coordinates of each listing, this information is not accu-
rate. Due to privacy issues, Airbnb does not provide the exact coordinates. However,
these coordinates provide a relatively good idea where the listings are located. I
use geo-mapping to determine the neighborhoods for listings in San Francisco based
on the coordinates. I merge the neighborhoods’ data with information provided by
https://www.walkscore.com which includes walking, transit and biking scores for dif-
ferent San Francisco’s neighborhoods.5 Each of these scores is scaled between 0 to 100
3Instant booking is an option which a guest can book a listing without getting approved by a
host.
4Less conventional property types include boat, bungalow, cabin, camper/RV, cave, chalet, dorm,
serviced apartment, tent, townhouse, treehouse, and villa. I exclude listings which are bed and
breakfast, boutique hotels and hostels to focus on hosts who do not provide accommodation as a
full-time and professional job.
5In San Francisco’s neighborhoods, safety and walkability can vary by block to block. Therefore,
https://www.walkscore.com assigns a score based on sub-neighborhoods. For instance, Mission
neighborhood in walkscore.com is divided into smaller sub-neighborhoods. Unfortunately, there is
no unified definition for such sub-neighborhoods available. Therefore, I rely on the scores on the
neighborhood scale.
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where 100 is the highest score. The walking score is based on an average of ratings
given to categories such as dining and drinking, groceries, shopping, errands, parks,
schools, culture, and entertainment. The transit score measures the availability of
public transportation based on its type and proximity. The biking score evaluates
the availability of bike lanes and road connection.
To examine the effect of competition on information disclosure in San Fran-
cisco’s listings I use
Word Countlp =α + β1Competitionlp + β2Xl + β3Zl + β4Nl + γp + lp (2.1)
where Word Count is the number of words used in listing’s description written by a
host for listing l with property type p and it is a proxy for information discloure.
Competition in the specification (1) is the variable of interest which measures
the number of listings within a certain distance. The variable of interest is calculated
for less than half a mile, one mile, and five miles. For listings in San Francisco, I do
not use listings beyond five miles because the width of San Francisco is measured as
maximum 12 miles. To calculate the number of listings within a certain distance, I
divide the listings based on their room types. In other words, for a given listing as a
private room, I count the number of private room listings in the certain distance, and
for a given listing as an entire house or apartment, I count the number of entire house
or apartment listings in the certain distance. I use Vincenty distance to calculate the
distance between two coordinates. The Vincenty distance considers the ellipsoidal
feature of the earth which provides a relatively accurate measure for a distance be-
tween two locations. From calculating the Vincenty distance, I get a matrix which
shows how far a listing is from other listings and I count the number of listings within
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half a mile, one mile, and five miles as an estimate for competition.6 Although the
heterogeneity among listings of the same room type is quite significant, the number
of listing can be a relative measure for competition for each listing with the same
room type.
X, Z, and N are listing’s, host’s, and neighborhood’s characteristics respec-
tively. To control for average differences across property types on listing’s description,
I include property type fixed effect γp.
Moreover, to examine the impact competition on information disclosure with
a given room type in San Francisco and surrounding cities, I use
Word Countlpc =α + β1Competitionlpc + β2Xl + β3Zl + γp + ζc + lpc (2.2)
where Word Count is the number of words used in the listing’s description written
by a host for listing l with property type p in city c. Besides property fixed effects, I
include city fixed effect ζc to control for average differences across cities on an amount
of listing’s description.
2.3 Results
In this section, first, I focus on listings in San Francisco’s neighborhoods to
examine whether there are any differences in listings’ descriptions among different
neighborhoods. Furthermore, I investigate how the number of competing listings in
San Francisco impacts the information disclosure via listing’s description. Second, I
examine whether competition influences information revealed by hosts in San Fran-
cisco and its surrounding cities.
6I use python’s package of geopy to calculate Vincenty distance.
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Table 2.2 includes the average of word count for listings in San Fransico’s
neighborhoods. It is obvious that there are variations in listings’ descriptions within
neighborhoods for private room listings and entire place listings. Results in Table 2.3
shows the effect of the neighborhood’s characteristics on the amount of information
revealed in the description of listings. Neighborhood’s characteristics are walking
score, transit score, and biking score. Based on the results in Table 2.3, the walk-
ing score has a statistically significant effect on the listing’s description for private
room and entire house/apartment listings. In other words, a higher walking score is
correlated with more words in listing’s description for both room types. This may
be interpreted as hosts sharing proximity of their listings with famous attractions or
suggesting nearby local places to their guests within walking distance.
I examine model (2.1) to study the impact of competition on the listing’s
description in San Francisco. The results are presented in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 for
private room and entire house/apartment listings respectively. According to Table 2.4,
a higher number of competitors within half a mile, one mile, and five miles increases
the number of words used by hosts in the description. Moreover, the increase in the
number of competitors for further distances has a smaller impact on the number of
words in listing’s description used by hosts. For private rooms in San Francisco, a
higher number of listings may lead to information disclosure which can be interpreted
as hosts’ attempt to differentiate their listing’s compared to their rivals’. Table 2.5
is specific to the entire house/apartment listings in San Francisco. Although the
results in Table 2.5 are similar to the results for private room listings, they are not
statistically significant.
The results of the model (2.2) are shown in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 for private
rooms and entire house/apartment for listings in San Francisco and its surrounding
cities. The results are similar to the listings which are located in San Francisco. In
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other words, for private rooms, the number of competitors has a statistically signifi-
cant effect on the description of listings, whereas such relationship is not statistically
significant for the entire house/apartment listings.
2.4 Conclusion and Future Work
Given the increasing growth of online platforms to accommodate lodging for
travelers, it is crucial to understand different aspects involved in such markets. The
suppliers in online markets may not always have the incentives to reveal all infor-
mation about their listings. As a result, information asymmetries can exist in these
markets. This chapter shows whether competition among Airbnb’s hosts may change
their incentives to share information about their listings.
I measure information provided by hosts with the number of words used in the
listing’s description. I examine the impact of competition on information disclosure
for listings with two different room types. My empirical results suggest that higher
number of listings for private room type increases the number of words in listing’s
description, whereas the amount of description in entire house/apartment room type
is not affected by the number of same room type listings.
There are a few caveats in this study which should be addressed in future
work. First, the number of words may not be a sufficient measure for information
disclosure on this platform. Combination of the number of words and number of
pictures may provide a better compliment for providing information. Second, having
a similarity measure which compares more similar listings with each other can be
invaluable. In other words, having more detailed information about listings based
on blocks in metropolitan areas or size and architecture style of listings can group
listings more subtly. Finally, having more data for different cities of Airbnb’s listings
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can lead us to a better understanding of information disclosure and competition in
this platform. Moreover, comparison of incentives among Airbnb’s hosts and its
competing platforms such as booking.com, homeaway.com, etc. may be helpful to
study information disclosure in different online platforms.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Listings in San Francisco
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Private Room:
Word Count 326.01 347.562 1 2,456 813
Number of Listings in Half a Mile 25.301 14.561 0 61 813
Number of Listings in One Mile 87.203 45.905 3 100 813
Number of Listings in Five Miles 743.523 76.655 460 812 813
Price 163.61 482.746 38 10,000 813
Instant Booking 0.239 0.427 0 1 813
Person Capacity 2.091 0.809 1 9 813
Extra Language 0.322 0.468 0 1 813
Number of Bathrooms 1.146 0.388 0 3 813
Number of Bedrooms 1.018 0.181 0 4 813
Host Owning a Pet 0.26 0.439 0 1 813
Allows Children 0.594 0.491 0 1 813
Allows Infants 0.514 0.5 0 1 813
Allows Pets 0.093 0.291 0 1 813
Allows Smoking 0.044 0.206 0 1 813
Allows Events 0.058 0.234 0 1 813
Entire House/Apartment:
Word Count 372.04 388.327 1 3,386 779
Number of Listings in Half a Mile 28.657 18.830 0 86 779
Number of Listings in One Mile 96.067 52.546 1 195 779
Number of Listings in Five Miles 717.415 77.983 354 778 779
Price 320.92 437.88 60 10,000 779
Instant Booking 0.213 0.41 0 1 779
Person Capacity 4.077 2.255 1 16 779
Extra Language 0.24 0.427 0 1 779
Number of Bathrooms 1.288 0.588 0 8 779
Number of Bedrooms 1.454 1.037 0 10 779
Host Owning a Pet 0.094 0.292 0 1 779
Allows Children 0.809 0.394 0 1 779
Allows Infants 0.742 0.438 0 1 779
Allows Pets 0.117 0.321 0 1 779
Allows Smoking 0.021 0.142 0 1 779
Allows Events 0.056 0.231 0 1 779
Notes: This table includes summary statistics of Airbnb’s listings in San Francisco based on
room type which are available on January 14th of 2017 for check in and check out dates of
Friday, February 3rd to Sunday, February 5th of 2017.
55
Table 2.2: Average Word Count for San Francisco’s Listings by Room Type
Neighborhoods Private Room Entire Apartment/House
Bayview 160 441.556
Bernal Heights 329.462 433
Castro and Upper Market 382.454 436.905
Chinatown 74.5 857.633
Civic Center 72.25 378.8
Cow Hollow 380.222 170.917
Crocker Amazon 88.6 257.6
Diamond Heights 196.333 —
Excelsior 290.2381 542.643
Financial District 96.167 323.75
Glen Park 310 464
Haight Ashbury 322.128 468.464
Inner Richmond 383.214 351.706
Inner Sunset 291.733 278.364
Lakeshore 190 105
Lower Nob Hill 220.25 263.609
Marina 365.75 269.444
Mission 400.706 370.033
Nob Hill 268.233 236.632
Noe Valley 390.107 396.196
North Beach 190.727 317.727
Ocean View 245.476 306.417
Outer Mission 345.75 367.067
Outer Richmond 283.211 444.5
Outer Sunset 269 383.964
Pacific Heights 375.333 280.143
Parkside 253.133 446.938
Potrero Hill 300.333 353.8
Presidio Heights 394.2 353.25
Russian Hill 366.8 219.36
Seacliff 274 615
South of Market 241.642 243.986
Tenderloin 235.133 152
Twin Peaks 229.9 385.444
Visitacion Valley 170.667 618.5
West Twin Peaks 721.269 338.526
Western Addition 391.339 454.634
Notes: This table includes average word count based on room types for listings in San Fran-
cisco’s neighborhoods which are available on January 14th of 2017 for check in and check out
dates of Friday, February 3rd to Sunday, February 5th of 2017.
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Table 2.3: Word Count by Room Type in San Francisco’s Neighborhoods
Word Count Word Count
in Private Room in Entire House/Apartment
Walking Score 3.277** 3.377*
(1.585) (1.961)
Transit Score -0.606 -2.221
(1.260) (1.405)
Biking Score 0.642 -2.166*
(0.966) (1.255)
Property FE Yes Yes
Observations 813 779
R2 0.027 0.033
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. In parenthesis, robust standard errors are reported.
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Table 2.4: Word Count in Private Room in San Francisco
(1) (2) (3)
Word Count Word Count Word Count
Number of Listings in Half a Mile 2.145**
(0.897)
Number of Listings in One Mile 0.823***
(0.318)
Number of Listings in Five Miles 0.528***
(0.154)
Instant Booking -9.749 -7.812 0.626
(25.982) (26.300) (26.455)
Person Capacity 32.936* 34.128** 35.233**
(17.037) (17.192) (17.288)
Cancellation Policy 136.235*** 135.860*** 136.193***
(15.478) (15.521) (15.488)
Extra Language 21.773 22.536 23.059
(23.254) (23.195) (23.266)
Walking Score 0.455 0.409 0.217
(1.522) (1.514) (1.587)
Transit Score -0.946 -1.150 0.015
(1.202) (1.225) (1.149)
Biking Score -0.481 -0.752 -0.965
(0.910) (0.892) (0.931)
Property FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 813 813 813
R2 0.196 0.198 0.202
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. In parenthesis, robust standard errors are reported.
These regressions include the number of bedrooms and bathroom, host owning a pet, allowing
children and infant, allowing a pet, allowing smoking, allowing events.
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Table 2.5: Word Count in Entire House/Apartment in San Francisco
(1) (2) (3)
Word Count Word Count Word Count
Number of Listings in Half a Mile 1.184
(0.971)
Number of Listings in One Mile 0.432
(0.387)
Number of Listings in Five Miles 0.213
(0.171)
Instant Booking 4.437 6.105 8.153
(28.308) (28.176) (28.911)
Person Capacity 25.944** 25.724** 26.192**
(10.126) (10.197) (10.396)
Cancellation Policy 103.482*** 103.726*** 104.423***
(15.282) (15.281) (15.547)
Extra Language 90.566*** 91.382*** 90.602***
(32.436) (32.462) (32.350)
Walking Score 2.390 2.470 2.475
(2.039) (2.073) (1.985)
Transit Score -3.201** -3.424** -2.218
(1.415) (1.576) (1.391)
Biking Score -1.918 -2.054* -2.394*
(1.224) (1.232) (1.248)
Property FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 779 779 779
R2 0.120 0.120 0.120
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. In parenthesis, robust standard errors are reported.
These regressions include the number of bedrooms and bathroom, host owning a pet, allowing
children and infant, allowing a pet, allowing smoking, allowing events.
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Table 2.6: Word Count in Private Room in San Francisco and Surrounding Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count
Number of Listings in Half a Mile 1.698**
(0.705)
Number of Listings in One Mile 0.613**
(0.257)
Number of Listings in Five Miles 0.341***
(0.079)
Number of Listings in Ten Miles 0.003
(0.041)
Instant Booking -11.205 -10.852 -5.151 -10.698
(17.181) (17.166) (17.279) (17.258)
Person Capacity 31.024*** 31.597*** 30.902*** 30.517***
(10.440) (10.532) (10.493) (10.417)
Cancellation Policy 95.510*** 95.108*** 95.648*** 97.709***
(9.200) (9.259) (9.186) (9.273)
Extra Language 40.766*** 40.454*** 39.842*** 41.046***
(15.164) (15.197) (15.084) (15.182)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673
R2 0.174 0.175 0.179 0.171
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. In parenthesis, robust standard errors are reported.
These regressions include the number of bedrooms and bathroom, host owning a pet, allowing
children and infant, allowing a pet, allowing smoking, allowing events.
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Table 2.7: Word Count in Entire House/Apartment in San Francisco and Surrounding
Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count
Number of Listings in Half a Mile 0.412
(0.768)
Number of Listings in One Mile -0.018
(0.254)
Number of Listings in Five Miles 0.142
(0.125)
Number of Listings in Ten Miles -0.171***
(0.061)
Instant Booking -9.949 -10.432 -7.109 -9.295
(20.153) (20.074) (20.527) (20.022)
Person Capacity 17.127*** 17.028*** 17.168*** 17.179***
(6.186) (6.201) (6.235) (6.172)
Cancellation Policy 88.067*** 88.283*** 88.460*** 86.648***
(10.302) (10.337) (10.430) (10.442)
Extra Language 66.802*** 66.115*** 66.728*** 64.659***
(20.351) (20.499) (20.372) (20.231)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,353 1,353 1,353 1,353
R2 0.111 0.111 0.112 0.114
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. In parenthesis, robust standard errors are reported.
These regressions include the number of bedrooms and bathroom, host owning a pet, allowing
children and infant, allowing a pet, allowing smoking, allowing events.
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Appendix A Conquest Cash and Loyalty Cash by
Type
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Conquest and Loyalty Offers by Type
Offers by Type Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Offering Loyalty on Luxury Foreign Cars 0.526 0.499 0 1 4,493
Offering Conquest on Luxury Foreign Cars 0.152 0.35 0 1 4,493
Offering Loyalty on Luxury Domestic Cars 0.935 0.185 0 1 858
Offering Conquest on Luxury Domestic Cars 0.522 0.472 0 1 858
Offering Loyalty on non-Luxury Foreign Cars 0.613 0.482 0 1 4,802
Offering Conquest on nonLuxury Foreign Cars 0.277 0.447 0 1 4,802
Offering Loyalty on non-Luxury Domestic Cars 0.802 0.327 0 1 3,276
Offering Conquest on non-Luxury Domestic Cars 0.566 0.442 0 1 3,276
Notes: This table includes summary statistics of loyalty and conquest offers based on their
types of brand and origin from December 2017 to April 2018 in selected cities. Offering loyalty
and offering conquest are the fraction of these rebates among different trims of a nameplate.
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Appendix B Conquest Cash and Loyalty Cash within
Makes
Table 9: Conquest Cash and Loyalty Cash by Makes
Offers Makes
Neither Conquest nor Loyalty Honda, Mercedes-Benz, Smart, Subaru, Volkswagen
Only Loyalty Infiniti, Jaguar, Mini, Toyota
Only Conquest —
Both Loyalty and Conquest Acura, Audi, BMW, Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Chrysler,
Dodge, Fiat, Ford, GMC, Genesis, Hyundai, Jeep, Kia,
Land Rover, Lexus, Lincoln, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
Porsche, Ram, Volvo
Notes: This table includes the list of makes which use conquest cash and loyalty cash in
Decmeber 2017 to April 2018 in six cities of Boston, Chicago, Houston, Jacksonville, Kansas City,
and New York City.In this table, some of the makes which use both conquest and loyalty offers
have specific nameplates which have only conquest offers, and only loyalty offers. For instance,
both Hyundai and Lincoln offer conquest and loyalty cash on their nameplates; however, Hyundai
offers only conquest cash on nameplate Kona with model year 2018, and Lincoln offers only
loyalty cash on nameplate Navigator with model year 2018.
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borhoods
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Table 10: Number of Listings in San Francisco’s Neighborhoods
Neighborhoods Private Room Entire Apartment/House
Bayview 22 9
Bernal Heights 39.462 38
Castro and Upper Market 44 21
Chinatown 2 30
Civic Center 4 5
Cow Hollow 9 12
Crocker Amazon 5 5
Diamond Heights 3 —
Excelsior 21 14
Financial District 6 16
Glen Park 8 10
Haight Ashbury 39 28
Inner Richmond 28 17
Inner Sunset 15 11
Lakeshore 5 2
Lower Nob Hill 16 23
Marina 16 27
Mission 92 61
Nob Hill 30 19
Noe Valley 28 46
North Beach 11 22
Ocean View 21 12
Outer Mission 28 15
Outer Richmond 19 18
Outer Sunset 46 28
Pacific Heights 15 28
Parkside 15 16
Potrero Hill 21 25
Presidio Heights 5 4
Russian Hill 20 25
Seacliff 2 1
South of Market 53 71
Tenderloin 15 17
Twin Peaks 10 9
Visitacion Valley 12 4
West Twin Peaks 26 19
Western Addition 62 71
Notes: This table includes number of listings based on room types for listings in San Francisco’s
neighborhoods which are available on January 14th of 2017 for check in and check out dates of
Friday, February 3rd to Sunday, February 5th of 2017.
66
Appendix D All Listings in San Francisco and Sur-
rounding Cities
67
Table 11: Summary Statistics of Listings in San Francisco and Surrounding Cities
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Private Room:
Word Count 295.421 299.616 1 2,456 1,673
Number of Listings in Half a Mile 16.69 13.923 0 61 1,673
Number of Listings in One Mile 56.117 46.002 0 180 1,673
Number of Listings in Five Miles 526.051 274.745 20 884 1,673
Number of Listings in Ten Miles 904.341 303.036 69 1,401 1,673
Price 124.219 341.177 25 10,000 1,673
Instant Booking 0.213 0.409 0 1 1,673
Person Capacity 2.082 0.854 1 10 1,673
Extra Language 0.332 0.471 0 1 1,673
Number of Bathrooms 1.118 0.364 0 3.5 1,673
Number of Bedrooms 1.019 0.282 0 10 1,673
Host Owning a Pet 0.298 0.457 0 1 1,673
Allows Children 0.632 0.482 0 1 1,673
Allows Infants 0.553 0.497 0 1 1,673
Allows Pets 0.106 0.308 0 1 1,673
Allows Smoking 0.05 0.217 0 1 1,673
Allows Events 0.062 0.24 0 1 1,673
Entire House/Apartment:
Word Count 341.305 337.488 1 3,386 1,353
Number of Listings in Half a mile 18.945 18.5 0 86 1,353
Number of Listings in One Mile 63.038 56.337 0 196 1,353
Number of Listings in Five Miles 500.004 282.591 12 806 1,353
Number of Listings in Ten Miles 784.617 286.185 60 1,141 1,353
Price 271.709 364.507 50 10,000 1,353
Instant Booking 0.189 0.392 0 1 1,353
Person Capacity 4.054 2.4 1 16 1,353
Extra Language 0.275 0.447 0 1 1,353
Number of Bathrooms 1.292 0.632 0 8 1,353
Number of Bedrooms 1.483 1.113 0 10 1,353
Host Owning a Pet 0.128 0.334 0 1 1,353
Allows Children 0.794 0.405 0 1 1,353
Allows Infants 0.724 0.447 0 1 1,353
Allows Pets 0.13 0.337 0 1 1,353
Allows Smoking 0.022 0.147 0 1 1,353
Allows Events 0.071 0.257 0 1 1,353
Notes: This table includes summary statistics of listings in San Francisco and its surrounding
cities based on room type which are available on January 14th of 2017 for check in and check
out dates of Friday, February 3rd to Sunday, February 5th of 2017.
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Table 12: Frequency of Listings in San Francisco and Surrounding Cities
Cities Frequency
Alameda 1.39
Albany 1.06
Belvedere Tiburon 0.23
Berkeley 7.44
Brisbane 0.43
Burlingame 0.76
Corte Madera 0.30
Daly City 3.07
El Cerrito 0.69
El Sobrante 0.30
Emeryville 0.59
Greenbrae 0.07
Hillsborough 0.03
Kensington 0.40
Kentfield 0.20
Larkspur 0.26
Mill Valley 2.71
Millbrae 0.66
Muir Beach 0.03
Oakland 17.48
Orinda 0.40
Pacifica 1.12
Piedmont 0.20
Point Richmond 0.07
Richmond 1.59
San Anselmo 0.03
San Bruno 1.20
San Francisco 52.64
San Leandro 0.40
San Mateo 0.89
San Pablo 0.23
San Quentin 0.03
San Rafael 0.96
Sausalito 0.56
South San Francisco 1.12
Stinson Beach 0.36
Tiburon 0.13
Notes: This table includes the frequency of Airbnb’s listings in San Francisco and its surround-
ing cities which are available on January 14th of 2017 for check in and check out dates of Friday,
February 3rd to Sunday, February 5th of 2017.
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Table 13: Average Word Count for San Francisco and Surrounding Cities by Room
Type
Cities Private Room Entire House/Apartment
Alameda 225.233 249.25
Albany 270.4 231.857
Belvedere Tiburon 203.75 255.333
Berkeley 302.919 300.539
Brisbane 178.25 445.375
Burlingame 356.333 481.25
Corte Madera 339 331.2
Daly City 203.2 268.087
El Cerrito 394.177 408.5
El Sobrante 263.429 233.5
Emeryville 302.083 233.167
Greenbrae 194 796
Hillsborough – 48
Kensington 185.5 271.75
Kentfield 201.333 293.667
Larkspur 64 376.857
Mill Valley 312.514 356.467
Millbrae 315.083 229.875
Muir Beach – 302
Oakland 277.280 296.198
Orinda 264.571 184
Pacifica 294.263 367.933
Piedmont 51 262.5
Point Richmond 45 468
Richmond 207.432 259.455
San Anselmo 347 –
San Bruno 171.45 201.933
San Francisco 325.730 371.432
San Leandro 165.833 119.2
San Mateo 235.429 194.167
San Pablo 106.333 367
San Quentin – 59
San Rafael 274.923 274.125
Sausalito 249.75 327.385
South San Francisco 260.130 233.909
Stinson Beach – 432.182
Tiburon 223 256
Notes: This table includes average word count based on room types for listings in San Francisco
and its surrounding cities which are available on January 14th of 2017 for check in and check
out dates of Friday, February 3rd to Sunday, February 5th of 2017.
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